Palestine in the Olympics
Al-Ahram, Egypt, June 13
The presence of a Palestinian sports delegation at the opening ceremony of the Summer Olympics in Paris on July 26 will serve as a profound symbol of resistance and resilience. The Palestine Olympic Committee has faced significant challenges in preparing its athletes, who have endured tremendously harsh conditions. Unfortunately, the number of athletes who have qualified for the games is expected to be small due to the severe and ongoing aggression against Gaza and continued attacks in the West Bank. Yet their qualification stands as a major accomplishment amid an aggression that has obliterated the Gaza Strip, including its entire sports infrastructure and the headquarters of the Olympic Committee at Yarmouk Stadium. At least 170 Palestinian athletes have lost their lives in Gaza.
The Palestinian delegation will participate proudly, carrying the flag of their homeland as a testament to their well-earned qualification, not merely by invitation from the International Olympic Committee, which often claims a neutrality that appears absent. This committee swiftly banned Russian and Belarusian athletes from competing under their national flags following the outbreak of war in Ukraine but conspicuously ignored the aggression in Gaza. Russian athletes were forced to compete as independents, despite the fact that no Ukrainian athletes have been killed in the war.
Moreover, the leadership of the International Olympic Committee disregarded numerous global voices calling for Israel to be treated similarly to Russia and Belarus. The committee’s Executive Board chose to turn a deaf ear to liberal advocates who organized a week to resist Israeli colonialism and apartheid in conjunction with their meeting in Switzerland this past March. These advocates urged the board to uphold Olympic principles and take a stand against the crime of genocide by barring its perpetrators from officially representing their country in the Paris Games.
Following this meeting, Thomas Bach, president of the International Olympic Committee, seemed to attempt a veneer of impartiality when he announced he would extend an invitation to the Palestine Olympic Committee even if none of its athletes qualified. However, the qualification of Palestinian athletes exposes this gesture as a failed attempt to conceal a clear bias toward a brutal conflict within a realm intended to symbolize peace. – Wahid Abdel-Meguid
There Are Those Who Seek To Politicize the Hajj
Okaz, Saudi Arabia, June 13
Every Hajj season brings to light two distinct dynamics. On one side, there is the Saudi government, which dedicates extensive resources and efforts to ensuring the welfare of pilgrims, facilitating their rituals, and maintaining a robust apparatus to welcome thousands of visitors. Concurrently, there exists another faction determined to undermine Saudi Arabia – not for any failure in their service to the pilgrimage, but precisely because of their dedication to pilgrims. This faction opposes the success of Hajj, seeking to hijack it and deviate it from its spiritual objectives, as well as using it as a stage for disputes, political agendas, and even as a bargaining tool with Israel and the US.
It is almost unfathomable to imagine that some would manipulate Hajj for political and military negotiations. They aim to politicize it, reducing the significance of worship to hollow rituals and transforming it into a platform for political maneuvering and bargaining with major powers. This is their modus operandi. Unfortunately, this is the reality that some entities desire, a reality that Saudi Arabia and its leaders, from the founding king to the present day, have consistently resisted.
Over the years, the Holy Lands have been embroiled in political conflicts, leading to the desecration of sacred sites and the distortion of the religious purposes of Hajj and Umrah. The first prominent instance of such conflict was the political feud between Abd Allah ibn al-Zubayr and his compatriots on one side and the Umayyads on the other. Ibn al-Zubayr declared a parallel caliphate from Mecca, challenging the Umayyad rule based in Damascus. This political dispute escalated into a prolonged and bloody war, culminating in 73 AH with the killing of Ibn al-Zubayr and the bombardment of the Kaaba, damaging the holiest of Muslim sites and killing thousands of innocent Muslims. The second significant disruption occurred when the Qarmatians carried their sectarian conflict into the Holy Land, launching a brutal attack on Mecca during the Hajj season of 317 AH. They massacred pilgrims and residents, violated the sanctity of the House of God, removed the door of the Kaaba, stole its covering, and uprooted the Black Stone, transporting it to their strongholds in eastern Arabia.
Infallible blood was shed in the Holy Lands during the sacred month of Dhu al-Hijja. There are numerous other incidents that underscore this theme, such as the Ottoman bombardment of the Holy Kaaba and the occupation of the Holy Mosque by a deviant group, halting prayers and worship for 14 days. These events highlight that any deviation from the sacred purpose of the Kaaba, especially during Hajj, leads to devastating consequences, for the place and time must be respected.
Hajj, in essence, is a pilgrimage devoted to God Almighty, where pilgrims abandon worldly pleasures to immerse themselves in worship in the holy lands. Any disruption to this sacred intention inevitably leads to bloody conflicts, as history has repeatedly shown. The Islamic world is rife with factions, groups, and sects engaged in ceaseless strife.
Bloodshed among these groups occurs almost daily, yet some wish to drag these conflicts into the sacred space of Hajj, settling their scores on this holy stage. Historical incidents affirm that any attempt to alter the divine rules governing worship at the holy sites invites severe consequences. This aligns with the divine retribution observed in the tale of Abraha, who sought to demolish the Kaaba to shift worship to his own constructed edifice. Such actions, attempting to replace the Kaaba of worship with the Kaaba of politics, inevitably invite a heavy toll on the transgressors. – Mohammed Al-Saeed
Will the New Iranian President Be Any Different?
Asharq Al-Awsat, London, June 13
In an April meeting between Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah and Quds Force commander Esmail Qaani, a significant directive from Iran’s supreme leader was unveiled. Qaani conveyed that Iran had no vested interest in escalating tensions with Israel, regardless of the provocations, and stressed the importance of avoiding a regional war that could be triggered by Hezbollah’s retaliation for southern Lebanon.
Sources close to the Shi’ite leadership reported that Nasrallah, despite holding a differing opinion, accepted these directives. However, this acceptance posed a challenge to his credibility among various Lebanese groups and supporters across the Arab world, particularly after he vowed to attack Israel. Qaani firmly stated that while this directive was a decision of the Islamic Republic, it was up to Nasrallah to manage the expectations and reactions of his followers.
Nasrallah’s disagreement with Qaani’s unequivocal stance led to a tense conclusion of the meeting, after which Nasrallah remained uncharacteristically absent from public appearances for over two months. During this period, rumors proliferated, with some speculating he was suffering from a delicate health condition – rumors that turned out to be unfounded. Following Qaani’s visit, the late Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian made two subsequent trips to Beirut, each time meeting with Nasrallah in efforts to ameliorate tensions and align views between Hezbollah and Iran.
These diplomatic efforts succeeded, with Nasrallah re-emerging publicly and advocating for “strategic patience” as a rationale for not retaliating against the brutal Israeli strikes on southern Lebanon – strikes that had obliterated entire villages with phosphorus bombs, killing hundreds of Hezbollah field leaders and displacing thousands.
As questions mount regarding Iran’s agenda in Lebanon, it becomes evident that Iran treats the country as a mere conduit for its strategic goals, disregarding the well-being of Lebanon and its citizens. Just as Iran leveraged the demarcation of maritime borders between Israel and Lebanon in exchange for the release of its frozen billions in Western banks, it now appears to be using Hezbollah’s nonresponse as a bargaining chip with the US. The catastrophic toll on Lebanese soil, marked by bombing, rampant poverty, and displacement, seems of little concern to Tehran.
Notably, the dynamics between Lebanon and Iran show little prospect of change even with the deaths of president Ebrahim Raisi and Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian. Amir-Abdollahian’s sudden and frequent visits to Lebanon underscored Iran’s dismissive attitude toward Lebanon’s sovereignty.
This approach was personified again with acting Foreign Minister Ali Bagheri Kani, whose initial visit to Lebanon blatantly disregarded the local electoral processes. The implicit message was clear: Lebanon’s significance lies solely in its relations with Iran, which leaves Beirut as a perpetual battleground for external interests. Iran’s response to the Israeli aggression, like the attack on its embassy in Damascus, was largely symbolic, little more than a smokescreen intended to create the illusion of action.
The retaliation resulted in negligible casualties or damage, while Iranian propaganda hailed it as a victory. Even in its support of other factions like Hamas, despite showcasing solidarity with prominent figures such as Ismail Haniyeh, Iran’s retaliatory threats have always been markedly selective, sparking only when its direct interests are threatened, as seen in its reprisal for the killing of military adviser Saeed Abyar.
The recurring theme throughout the Islamic Republic’s history is one of political Machiavellianism and religious pretense. Iran supports and arms the Houthis to disrupt maritime shipping lanes and nurtures Hezbollah to secure Iranian interests in Lebanon and Syria. The Quds Force serves more to expand Iranian power rather than liberate oppressed regions, contradicting any notion that Iranian influence inherently brings prosperity.
In conclusion, regardless of who assumes the presidency of the Islamic Republic, the regime’s behavior – both domestically and internationally – will remain unaltered. Even a purportedly moderate president will be shackled by the enduring tenets of the regime. As the international community waits, only time will reveal if internal pressures within Iran might eventually force a shift in its entrenched policies and practices. – Huda al-Husseini
Is Gaza Waiting for the US Elections?
Al-Ittihad, UAE, June 15
The Gaza crisis is reverberating within the American political agenda, and although the American electorate may prioritize domestic issues and daily lifestyle over foreign affairs, the ongoing conflict opens up a plethora of political and security scenarios. Given the difficult situation on the ground, genuine effort and commitment are required of the ceasefire mediators, particularly on the American side.
Indeed, it is clear that the path ahead remains fraught with challenges. Whether the mediators succeed or falter hinges on factors such as the resurgence of militant stances from both parties, as well as the Israeli government’s tendency toward escalation, compounded by recent resignations of War Cabinet ministers Benny Gantz and Gadi Eisenkot.
US President Joe Biden’s ceasefire plan and the Israeli government’s hesitations about certain aspects of it signal indecision and confusion, exacerbated by a lack of effective tools on both sides and the complex, multi-layered mediation framework. Despite seasoned politicians like CIA Director William Burns and National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan being part of the US administration, the current American mediation effort remains weak. The urgency to reach a deal is heightened by the looming presidential elections, which will soon divert the administration’s focus away from the Middle East toward Southeast Asia.
Faced with a choice between unfavorable scenarios, the potential return of Donald Trump could complicate matters even further. Trump’s previous tenure saw him recognize a “unified Jerusalem” as Israel’s capital, move the American Embassy there, propose the “deal of the century,” and handle the Arab-Israeli conflict as a transactional deal. The crux of the issue lies in the present and anticipated American maneuvers and the administration’s potential role in backing mediators and forging even a preliminary truce. Such a truce might merely be temporary before clashes resume under an Israeli plan to employ military action again. This scenario suggests that achieving any ceasefire depends on altering the Israeli government’s current approach.
Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu’s strategy of force has bolstered his popularity, according to recent polls. If Trump is reelected, he may revive the “deal of the century,” adapting it to new developments and possibly provoking substantial international reactions. This approach would focus on a direct solution, avoiding political or military confrontations between the two sides.
Should Biden remain in office, his proposals could be transformed into a disciplined plan, particularly if current attempts stagnate due to Israeli actions or a lack of mutual cooperation. The Israeli government’s plans could involve working on additional fronts, especially given the volatile situation along the Lebanon border, or annexing the West Bank and the Jordan Valley, thereby expediting shifts in reality on the ground. This could lead to increased tension rather than consensus, with these developments inevitably tied to the outcome of the forthcoming American elections and those in several European capitals. – Tarek Fahmy
Translated by Asaf Zilberfarb